One hundred days is traditionally viewed as an appropriate timeline in the United States for an initial analysis of the relative successes and failures of an incipient presidential administration. Given that April 30th represents the end of the embryonic stage of Trump 2.0, an evaluation of the primary foci of the president’s foreign policy is warranted. Several overarching themes in America’s engagement with the world have gained prominence since the inauguration a mere three months prior.
Spheres of influence are back. The Trump administration came to power on the wings of idealistic promises of ending the tragic conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Their actions—or lack thereof in the Israeli/Palestinian bloodletting—during the first one hundred days have, however, invoked memories of 19th Century spheres of influence when great powers colluded to carve up the globe in a bid to control trade and resources. Washington’s overt siding with Vladimir Putin in the on again/off again ceasefire negotiations have the Europeans rightly concerned that the Old World will be once again subject to Russian hegemony.
Furthermore, Trump’s public disdain for Taiwan leaves one to wonder how forcefully the United States would respond to any future Chinese moves against the island. Additionally, China is taking advantage of the chaos caused by the administration’s yo-yo tariff policy, improving relations with key countries in Southeast Asia that heretofore have looked favorably on engagement with Washington to balance perceived attempts at control from Beijing. The end result will likely be a much stronger position for the Middle Kingdom across East Asia.
No entangling alliances, please. As a corollary to the above, Trump and his key foreign policy advisors have consistently disparaged the importance of alliances to America’s global presence. This trend has been most saliently manifest in the administration’s outright hostility to erstwhile European allies who have been summarily excluded from Ukraine ceasefire negotiations despite the fact that it is fundamentally their security that is at risk.
America’s primary friends in Asia — Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea— are watching the developments in Europe with growing disquiet, wondering if their collective interests will be sacrificed by the White House to accommodate Beijing’s influence. Regardless of supportive rhetoric from Washington, American disengagement from long-standing commitments to Europe will sow distrust amongst U.S. allies across the globe with unforeseen consequences.
Who needs soft power? Perhaps the most tangible expression of Trump 2.0’s contempt for America’s previous place in the world has been the rapid dismantling of decades-long programs of assistance to the most vulnerable throughout the world. Given that America’s global aid programs represented a budgetary pittance compared to this country’s hard power expenditures, one can only deduce that the rationale for the cuts was primarily ideological, not financial. Notwithstanding Secretary of State Rubio’s blathering about efficiencies, the message that the administration’s gutting of life-saving programs previously managed by USAID sends to the rest of the world is that you’re on your own, America doesn’t care about you anymore.
While helping those in need is a key element in the soft power tool box, how a state acts on the international stage also matters. Treating other nations with respect, diplomatically working through differences behind closed doors, and supporting friends in need all contribute to international approbation, a core foreign policy objective that used to separate America from the more machiavellian powers in the world. The damage to U.S. soft power caused by Trump 2.0’s actions over the past three months will be difficult to reverse.
My country for rare earth minerals. The new administration has been very clear that securing access to natural resources and rare earth minerals is a priority. One cannot argue with this goal as China currently has a monopoly on the refined production of rare earth minerals. According to a report by the International Energy Agency, in 2023 Beijing accounted for about 61% of rare earth production and 92% of their processing. Trump is right to explore ways to lessen Washington’s dependence on China in this critical realm.
Unfortunately, threatening to take over Greenland and subsume Canada as our 51st state in the process taints an otherwise responsible policy. Finding alternate suppliers for rare earth minerals and other critical natural resources would best be done in coordination with friends and allies, sharing costs and jointly developing the necessary infrastructure for multilateral benefit. The previous sentence is anathema to the current masters in Washington who, in spite of a globalized world, are married to the concept of America First.
In closing, vacuous hyperbole does not make good policy and while Trump is the uncontested master of the former, his record to date in the international arena is sadly lacking in the latter. If the first one hundred days of his administration are an accurate augury of the remaining three years and nine months, America and the world are in for quite the wild ride.
Note: This article was published on 29 April by the Brattleboro Reformer and on 1 May by the Monadnock Ledger-Transcript.
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