Bob Beck's Foreign Policy Blog

This is the final article in a four-part series on U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century, the focus of which is to explain how America went from being the self-proclaimed “indispensable” leader of the free world in the 1990s to today’s more conflicted and introspective great power. 

Nine years ago, when Donald Trump was first elected President of the United States, only his most ardent supporters would have predicted that he would have such a significant influence on American foreign policy and, by extension, the wider world in which we live. However, many would now argue that he is, for better or worse, the most consequential U.S. leader since the end of the Cold War. 

During Trump’s first term, the basic outline of his world view began to emerge. He withdrew from international accords that did not conform to his America First agenda, including the Paris climate agreement, the Trans-Pacific partnership, the Iran nuclear deal, and United Nations organizations related to culture, education, and human rights. Furthermore, Trump provocatively questioned America’s long standing commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), squabbling openly with close European allies on defense and other issues. Moreover, the president bluntly played the economic nationalism card, using tariffs and protective trade policies as weapons against friends and foes alike. The cumulative result of Trump 1.0’s foreign engagement was global uncertainty of Washington’s reliability and, more generally, America’s place in the world. 

Nevertheless, most analysts would assert that Trump was somewhat held in check during his first term (let’s call it Trump light) by an experienced and relatively less extreme staff, mollifying his worst foreign policy instincts and, in the process, maintaining a modicum of trust with our nation’s most important allies. Senior officials such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton—both strongly conservative—by and large kept the President within certain broad policy crash barriers. Joe Biden’s election in November of 2020 precluded, at least for four years, Trump’s capacity to fully realize his nativist foreign policy objectives.

While many in America and across the world anticipated that the 2020 elections and subsequent political meltdown associated with the January 6th brouhaha at the capitol signaled the end of the Trump era, they were sorely mistaken. The Biden administration immediately reminded allies and adversaries that “America was back,” which in the short term was true as Washington reinvigorated sagging alliances, reengaged on climate change and world health, led a successful effort to manage the COVID crisis, and expertly galvanized a robust western response to Moscow’s naked aggression against Ukraine.

America’s “return” was short-lived, however, as the Biden years proved to be a brief interregnum in a sustained Trumpian assault of long-standing foreign policy norms and convictions. Biden’s term in office was highlighted by a much-criticized final withdrawal from Afghanistan, a meandering Chinese spy balloon, and the back to back crises of the Russia /Ukraine war and renewed bloodshed in the Middle East. It is also critical to note that despite Biden’s stark political differences from Trump, he continued some of his predecessor’s nationalistic economic policies, particularly in relation to China as well as in reducing U.S. dependence on foreign suppliers of critical supply chains. 

With Trump’s return to power in January of 2025, the Trump light of 2017-2021 morphed into a much more aggressive, confident, and vindictive leader. In the foreign policy realm, Trump 2.0 has loosely followed an America First script, except when he hasn’t. The president’s America First program, while ideologically isolationist, in practice is trending interventionist. From tariffs on/tariffs off to his pro-Russia/pro-Ukrainie/don’t care roller coaster regarding the bloodshed in Eastern Europe to his “Riviera of the Middle East” musings about the Gaza strip, the president has kept the world, as well as likely himself, guessing about his ultimate intentions. Moreover, by dismantling America’s international aid regime and publicly berating foreign leaders, the president has chosen the tools of fear and coercion over mutual respect, common values, and traditional friendships in pursuit of U.S. national interests. 

In spite of (or possibly because of) his above-mentioned histrionics, Trump has produced some noteworthy international achievements since returning to the White House. He has contributed to substantive peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Thailand and Cambodia—recently abjured by Thailand, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the M23 rebel group, and Israel and the Palestinians. Regarding the latter, Trump certainly deserves praise for using his influence with both Benjamin Netanyahu and Arab/Gulf autocrats—with whom he shares a love of power and an affinity for gold-plated chandeliers—to forge a tenuous, but so far lasting cease fire in Gaza. 

What Trump 2.0 means for U.S. foreign policy in the long term is still unclear but a post-Trump return to America as the leader of the “free world” seems implausible. We may instead be headed for a geopolitical paradigm in which the great powers—China, India, the United States, and Russia— exert predominance in their respective “backyards” in a dangerous and unstable spheres of influence scenario. Trump’s current sabre-rattling off the coast of Venezuela (the Monroe Doctrine on steroids) is indicative of this script as are China’s increasing belligerence vis-a-vis Taiwan and the South China Sea and Russia’s war-mongering in Eastern Europe.

As the contours of this new world (dis)order solidify, President Trump and his successors will likely face foreign policy challenges and threats that make those of the first quarter of this century seem like geopolitical child’s play. May our leaders, current and future, be up to the tasks ahead.

Note: This article was published on 20 November by both the Monadnock Ledger-Transcript and the Brattleboro Reformer.